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Memory awareness in early Alzheimer’s disease (AD) inﬂuences capacity to provide informed consent for a memory treatment.
This study investigated the extent to which aspects of memory awareness inﬂuence everyday decision-making capacity about
medication management in AD. 42 participants with mild AD and 50 healthy elders underwent clinical ratings of memory
awareness, metamemory testing, and an interview of everyday decision-making capacity regarding medication management. 45%
ofADsubjectswereclassiﬁedasaware(AAD)and55%asunaware(UAD)basedonclinicalratingsandsupportedbymetamemory
testing (P = .015). Capacity was impaired in each of the AD groups as compared to the healthy elders F(2,67) = 17.63, UAD,
P<. 01; AAD, P = .01). Within the AD group, capacity correlated selectively with awareness as measured with clinical ratings
(r =− .41, P = .007) but not objective metamemory testing (r =− .10, P = .60 ). Appreciation scores were lower in UAD as
compared with AAD F(1,35) = 8.36, P = .007. Unawareness of memory loss should heighten clinicians’ concern about everyday
decision-making capacity in AD.
1.Introduction
Decision-making capacity is fundamental to an individual’s
independence and invariably deteriorates at some point
along the dementia continuum, compromising autonomy
in ﬁnancial matters [1], medical care [2, 3], and informed
consent [4]. Even at the earliest stages of Alzheimer’s disease
(AD), decision making can be aﬀected, and certain features
of the disease may have direct implications for decision
making capacity in everyday life.
Previous work has demonstrated an important role for
metacognitive factors including memory awareness and
disease awareness in determining the likelihood that an
individual would demonstrate capacity to make a decision
about a treatment for AD [5]. While global cognition also
inﬂuenced capacity in this study, there was not a direct
relationship between these variables such that individuals
at any given level of cognition could have been judged as
competent or not competent. Consideration of the elements
that constitute capacity reveals why memory awareness may
haveclearrelevancefordecisionsaboutamemorytreatment.
Decision-making capacity has been conceptualized in terms
of four core components including (1) understanding =
The ability to comprehend information relevant to the
decision (e.g., risks and beneﬁts), (2) appreciation = The
ability to apply the information to one’s own situation, (3)
reasoning = The ability to consider and compare potential
consequences of various decisions, and (4) expression of
choice = the ability to communicate a stable choice [6, 7]. If
an individual is unaware that his or her memory is impaired,
then he or she may be unlikely to appreciate the personal
beneﬁts of a proposed memory treatment, or to accurately2 International Journal of Alzheimer’s Disease
anticipate and reason through the personal consequences
of a decision. In fact, reasoning and appreciation of beneﬁt
were the decision-making indices most related to disordered
awareness in the above study [5].
Theintegralroleforselfawarenessintreatmentdecisions
raises the question of whether decisions regarding every-
day functions are also compromised by reduced memory
awareness. Indeed, individuals with MCI and dementia are
often unaware not only of cognitive deﬁcits but of functional
limitations as well [1, 8–11]. Such unawareness may explain
why a patient who needs assistance with daily tasks might
make a less than optimal decision as to how to best carry out
the task. For example, reduced awareness of cognitive and
functional changes in patients with dementia can result in
unsafe behaviors such as continued driving [12].
The current study sought to examine how awareness
inﬂuences everyday decision making capacity related to
medication management, a critical daily responsibility for
many older adults. Medication management and adherence
can be challenged by cognitive and metacognitive limitations
in the context of dementia, and lack of illness awareness has
been raised as a particular threat that should alert clinicians
to potentially poor adherence [13]. We cross-sectionally
examined the eﬀects of memory awareness on decision
making capacity related to medication management in early
AD. We proposed that individuals with reduced awareness
would make suboptimal decisions about medication man-
agement (e.g., failure to use assistive devices or enlist help
from family members). Speciﬁcally, we hypothesized that
reduced awareness would be associated with lower capacity
scores secondary to impaired scores on the appreciation and
reasoning indices.
What is especially novel about this study is that we
investigated the inﬂuence of awareness on everyday decision
making, using both subjective and objective metrics to
comprehensively characterize memory awareness. We have
shown that objective metamemory tools capture the clinical
phenomenon of disordered awareness in AD [14]a n dh a v e
the potential to advance our understanding of its etiology,
nature, and consequences [15]. While related, however,
clinical ratings of awareness and metamemory scores also
have the potential to capture diﬀerent aspects of self-
assessment. For example, while a subjective clinical rating
of awareness characterizes an individual’s broad perception
of their memory, the objective metamemory task measures
individuals’ ability to systematically evaluate themselves on
an item-by-item basis in the context of a speciﬁc task.
Investigation of both awareness variables in relation to
decision making may further elucidate the manner in which
self awareness may aﬀect capacity. Moreover, examining the
precise factors which contribute to decision making will
better equip clinicians and researchers to identify individuals
with impairments in their capacity for navigating important
decisions on a daily basis.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants. Given the cognitive demands of the
metamemory task and our interest in studying capacity
in early AD, only patients with mild-to-moderate AD,
deﬁned as a score of 19 or greater on the Mini-Mental
State Examination (MMSE) [16] were recruited at two
separate centers, Columbia University Medical Center and
the University of Pennsylvania. Excluded were individuals
with ongoing moderate-to-severe psychiatric conditions,
and individuals with history of head injury, stroke, and other
neurologic illnesses that might impact cognition and/or the
presentation of AD.
Columbia University Medical Center (CUMC). 17 individ-
uals with mild AD were recruited through the CUMC
Alzheimer’s Disease Research Center and received com-
prehensive neurologic and neuropsychological evaluations
that were reviewed in a diagnostic consensus conference
attended by neurologists and neuropsychologists. Diagnoses
ofAlzheimer’sdiseaseweremadeaccordingtotheneurologic
disorders and stroke-Alzheimer’s disease and related disor-
ders association (NINDS-ADRDA) criteria. All participants
provided informed consent and were reimbursed $30.00 for
participation.
50 healthy elders were recruited from three sources: the
healthy control database available through the Alzheimer’s
Disease Research Center at CUMC, local senior centers, and
market mailing procedures that target a diverse group of
elders in New York City with a range of ethnic and educa-
tional backgrounds. Controls were thoroughly screened by
interviewtoexcludeindividualswithneurologic,psychiatric,
or severe medical disorders. Participants were considered
eligible for the study if they were age 55 or above, and scored
at least 24 on the MMSE.
University of Pennsylvania. 25 individuals with mild AD
wererecruitedthroughtheUniversityofPennsylvaniaPENN
Memory Center. Eligible patients and their family members
enrolled at the Center, who agreed to be contacted for
research studies, were sent a letter describing the study.
A research assistant then called the contact person, and
explained the study in more detail.
2.2. Procedures. Participants were seen for a two-hour test
session including a clinical rating of awareness, capacity
interview, metamemory testing, depression questionnaire,
andatestofglobalcognition.IndividualsseenatCUMCalso
underwent verbal episodic memory testing. Clinical ratings
of awareness were not obtained on healthy elders as clinical
diagnosis of AD was the criteria against which self-report
was measured. For the purposes of the capacity interview,
informants were contacted prior to the test session to obtain
the relevant information. Informants were not required for
healthy elders. This study was approved by the Institutional
Review Board at both medical centers and all individuals
provided informed consent prior to participation.
2.3. Measures
2.3.1. Global Cognition
Mini-Mental State Examination [16]. This commonly used
30-item measure of global cognition assesses orientation,
attention, language, visuospatial functioning, and memory.International Journal of Alzheimer’s Disease 3
2.3.2. Memory
Philadelphia Repeatable Verbal Learning Test (PVLT). [17]
The PVLT is a list-learning task modeled after the 9-word
CaliforniaVerbalLearningTest[18,19]inwhichparticipants
are required to learn 9 words (comprising three diﬀerent
categories: fruit, tools, and furniture) over the course of ﬁve
trials. The primary dependent variable was the recognition
discriminability index, a variable that has been shown to
reﬂect hippocampal integrity and to be diﬀerentially aﬀected
in AD versus other dementias [20].
2.3.3. Decision-Making Capacity
Assessment of Capacity for Everyday Decision Making (ACED)
[21]. This semistructured interview consists of 30 items
spanning the four abilities that constitute decision making
capacity: understanding, appreciation, reasoning, and expres-
sion of choice. This assessment tool was designed to evaluate
a person’s capacity to solve problems with each of three
daily decisions related to medication management, meal
preparation, or ﬁnances. In the current study, analyses of
decision-makingcapacitywererestrictedtothoseindividuals
who completed the medication management interview, as
only 5 individuals completed the meal preparation and
ﬁnances interviews.
The interview takes approximately 20 minutes to admin-
isterandisbasedonadiscussionwithaknowledgeableinfor-
mant who conﬁrms whether the participant has diﬃculty
managing medications and what the current procedure is for
managing the patient’s medications. (Copies of the instru-
ment can be obtained from Dr. Jason Karlawish.) Brieﬂy, the
Understanding subscale (0–10) assesses the individual’s abil-
itytocomprehendinformationaboutoptionsformedication
management for “individuals who have memory problems”
(e.g., use of a pillbox or assistance from another person), the
advantagesoftheseoptions,andthedisadvantages.Toreduce
demands on memory, this information is presented orally
to the subject and also printed on a sheet; the interviewer
reminds the subjects that this information is available if they
have forgotten what was presented orally by the examiner.
In order to receive credit for answers, subjects must respond
in their own words and not read verbatim from the sheet.
The appreciation subscale (0–8) assesses individuals’ ability
to apply the information to themselves by asking them if
they have any problems with remembering to take their
medication and whether they think one of the suggested
approaches to managing medications would beneﬁt them or
perhapsmakethingsharderforthem.Thereasoningsubscale
(0–10) requires subjects to evaluate options for medication
management in comparison to one another and to imagine
what the eﬀects of each option would be on their daily life.
Finally, expression of choice (0–2) requires subjects to state a
preference for managing their medications that is consistent
with their reasoning throughout the interview.
Every interview was audio recorded for scoring and
reliability purposes. All items were scored on a scale of 0–
2. All interviews with participants with AD were scored
by group consensus, and one out of every three interviews
with healthy elders was consensus scored. At CUMC, the
consensus group included at least two research assistants
and the PI (SC). At HUP, the consensus group included two
research assistants. A random sample of interviews obtained
at CUMC were reviewed and scored by the team at Penn to
ensure reliability across sites.
2.3.4. Awareness Measures
Clinical Ratings of Awareness. Testing sessions began with
a brief interview to allow the examiner to make a clinical
judgment regarding participant awareness of memory loss
in participants with AD. Examiners asked participants to
discuss their opinions of their memory abilities at the
current time and assigned a score ranging from 1 to 4 on
a modiﬁed version of the Anosognosia rating scale [22].
Participants were scored according to the following four
point ordinal rating system: 1 = full awareness (spontaneous
complaint or ready admission of memory loss along with
the recognition that the loss is consequential and abnor-
mal. Loss related to dementia or neurologic disease); 2 =
moderate awareness (spontaneousadmissionofmemoryloss;
however, loss is discussed in the context of “normal” age
related changes. No discussion of diagnosis); 3 = shallow
awareness (inconsistent or transient recognition of memory
loss, or uncertainty regarding memory loss. Patients may
acknowledgeinconsequentialmemoryloss);4=noawareness
(matter-of-fact denial of impairment in response to direct
questions regarding memory loss). If spontaneous responses
did not clearly ﬁt into a speciﬁc rating category (e.g., “My
memory is bad”), the examiner queried as appropriate (e.g.,
“Do you have a sense of why your memory is bad?”) to
extract suﬃcient information for assigning a score of 1–4.
Responseswererecordedverbatimandscoredbeforemoving
onto the remainder of the battery.
2.4. Metamemory Test
Task Development. The current metamemory test, a mod-
iﬁed episodic feeling of knowing task [14], was designed
as part of a larger ongoing study on metamemory in AD
and thus has two characteristics that require attention.
First, all healthy elders were randomly assigned to one of
three task conditions (described below). Therefore, in the
current study, analyses were conducted to ensure compara-
ble metamemory performance across all conditions before
collapsing scores across healthy elders. Second, metamemory
stimuliwereslightlymodiﬁedseveraltimesoverthecourseof
the study to improve the psychometric properties of the task.
Therefore, analyses were conducted to ensure comparable
metamemory performance across stimuli sets in both the
healthy elder and AD groups.
Task Instructions and Format. The examiner read the follow-
ing instructions, “During this task, I am going to tell you
about ﬁve people. I will tell you their name and something
about their background. Your task is to try to remember
this information as best you can. Please listen carefully”.
Immediately after the ﬁrst learning trial (e.g., Haxby wrote4 International Journal of Alzheimer’s Disease
Table 1: Demographics, cognition, and metacognition.
HE (n = 50) UAD (n = 19) AAD (n = 23) Fd f P
Age 68.00 (7.40) 78.52 (6.51) 77.26 (9.24) 0.27 1. 40 0.608
Education 15.66 (2.30) 14.83 (2.76) 16.79 (3.24) 4.50 1. 40 0.040
% Female 58 48 47 — 1 0.610
% Caucasian 78 83 100 — 1 0.079
MMSE (0 to 30) 29.24 (1.27) 24.35 (2.84) 24.37 (3.02) 0.01 1. 40 0.982
Memory 0.94 (0.09) 0.70 (0.17) 0.68 (0.15) 0.08 1. 15 0.779
Metamemory 0.61 (0.57) 0.18 (0.72) 0.68 (0.33) 6.67 1. 33 0.015
Depression 1.60 (2.00) 2.88 (3.60) 3.00 (2.39) 0.01 1. 29 0.917
Note. HE = healthy elder; UAD = unaware group; AAD = aware group; MMSE = mini-mental state examination; Memory = recognition discriminability
index; Mood = 15 item GDS. Awareness groups were determined on the basis of the clinical rating scale (AAD = fully-moderately aware; UAD = shallow—
no awareness). Analyses presented for UAD versus AAD.
a nonﬁction book about space travel; Corbett was a former
mayor in Nevada, etc.), predictions for memory performance
were acquired one at a time for each item by providing
written questions on 8.5   × 11   paper (e.g., Who was a
f o r m e rm a y o ro fN e v a d a ? ) and the following prompt read
aloud by the examiner: “There are eight possible answers
on the next page. Will you know which one is right—Yes,
Maybe,orNo?”Oncepredictionswererecorded,participants
were provided with eight answer choices and asked to select
the correct answer. The answer choices included the correct
response, the correct answers for the remaining 4 stimuli (to
control for basic familiarity eﬀects), and 3 new distractors.
In the standard condition, the tester then moved onto the
next item. All participants with AD and approximately one
third of healthy elders completed the standard condition;
the remaining two thirds of the healthy elders completed
the query and feedback conditions. In the query condition,
participants were asked whether they thought their answer
wascorrect(postdiction)priortomovingontothenextitem.
In the feedback condition, the examiner told the participant
if their answer was correct or incorrect prior to moving onto
the next item. This process was repeated for learning trials 2–
4 resulting in a total of 20 metamemory judgments. Stimuli
were presented in the same order across each of the four
learning trials; questions and answer choices were presented
in a pseudorandom order.
Dependent Variable. Resolution, or the relative accuracy
of self-judgments, reﬂects the extent to which accuracy
is high when predictions for performance are high, and
accuracyislowwhenpredictionsarelow.Thenonparametric
Goodman-Kruskal gamma statistic, a rank order correlation,
[23] was used to measure resolution. Gamma compares
the relative number of concordant and discordant predic-
tion/accuracy pairs, discarding “ties”, or instances in which
either the rating or accuracy in one pair is equal to that
in another pair. Limitations of gamma include a tendency
to be pulled to an extreme value on the basis of only one
concordance or discordance and a possibility that no score
can be calculated in the event of all ties. Although there
are many potential metamemory metrics, gamma was used
in the current study based on its selective association with
clinical ratings of memory awareness in AD in a previous
study from our lab [14], and its robustness as a measure of
self-speciﬁc processes in nondemented elders [24].
2.4.1. Mood
15-Item Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS). The GDS mea-
sures a variety of depressive symptoms (e.g., sadness, hope-
lessness, and worthlessness) and has demonstrated adequate
validity against the 30-item questionnaire [25]a sw e l la s
concurrent validity with other measures of depression [26].
3. Results
The following results were considered signiﬁcant at P<. 05.
Clinical Ratings of Awareness. 19% (n = 8) of AD partici-
pants were rated as fully aware of their memory loss, 26%
(n = 11) were rated as moderately aware, 38% (n = 16) were
rated as having shallow awareness, and 17% (n = 7) were
judged to have no awareness of memory loss. 45% of the
sample (full—moderate awareness) was collapsed into the
AwareAD (AAD) group, and 55% of participants (shallow—
no awareness) were compiled into the unaware AD (UAD)
group. Consistent with our previous report, the awareness
groups were indistinguishable on the basis of age, gender,
global cognition, or memory. See Table 1.H o w e v e r ,a w a r e -
ness groups in the current study diﬀered slightly in years of
education, with the aware group having approximately two
more years of formal schooling (P = .04). There was not a
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the proportion of aware
(29%) versus unaware (10%) individuals who managed their
medication independently (x2 = 1.954, P = .16).
Metamemory Task Condition and Stimuli Set. As part of a
larger study, healthy elders received one of three conditions
of the metamemory test. Of those who had a calculable
metamemory score in the current study (35 of 50 healthy
elders), 31% received the standard task condition, 40%
the query, and 29% the feedback. There was no diﬀerence
in metamemory score as a function of task condition,
F(2, 32) = 1.63, P = .213. There was also no diﬀerence inInternational Journal of Alzheimer’s Disease 5
Table 2: Components of decision making for medication management.
HE UAD AAD Fd fP
ACED total 28.94 (1.85) 22.33 (6.13) 25.56 (3.24) 3.64 1.35 .065
Understanding 9.48 (0.93) 7.52 (2.34) 7.87 (2.06) 0.23 1.35 .637
Appreciation 7.80 (0.57) 5.43 (2.25) 7.19 (1.05) 8.36 1.35 .007
Comparative reasoning 3.80 (0.57) 2.95 (1.43) 3.69 (0.60) 3.70 1.35 .062
Consequential reasoning 3.86 (0.41) 2.43 (1.43) 3.00 (1.26) 1.59 1.35 .215
Expression of choice 4.00 (0.00) 4.00 (0.00) 3.81 (0.54) 2.52 1.35 .122
Note. HE = healthy elder; UAD = unaware group; AAD = aware group; ACED = assessment of capacity for everyday decision making. Analyses presented
for UAD versus AAD.
metamemory as a function of stimuli set in the healthy elders
F(2, 32) = .10, P = .905, or AD group F(1, 33) = .68,
P = .415. Therefore, all metamemory scores were collapsed
across task condition and stimuli set for the current analyses.
Metamemory Scores. Gamma scores were calculable for 35 of
42 participants in the AD group (83%) and 35 of 50 healthy
elders (70%). The remaining participants demonstrated no
variability in their predictions (yes, maybe, and no) or in
their accuracy. In a replication of our previous ﬁndings,
gamma scores in the AD group were signiﬁcantly lower in
the unaware group than in the aware group (P = .015). See
Table 1 for results by awareness group in individuals with
AD.
Decision Making Capacity. In the AD group, analyses exam-
ining capacity were restricted to the 34 individuals who
completed the medication management version of the
ACED. Mean scores for the ACED total score and subscores
by awareness group are presented in Table 2.Am u l t i v a r i a t e
general linear model was used to compare ACED scores
across the two AD groups and healthy elders. Analyses
revealed that ACED scores were signiﬁcantly lower in each
of the AD groups than in the healthy elders (F(2, 67) =
17.63, UAD, P<. 01; AAD, P = .01). Performance on the
ACED did not vary as a function of whether or not
participants managed their medications independently at
home F(1, 32) = .011, P = .92.
Memory Awareness and Capacity. A univariate analysis of
variance was used to examine capacity scores as a function
of clinically determined awareness level in the AD group.
Results are reported in Table 2. Total ACED score was
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across groups (P = .065), but
performanceontheappreciationindexwaslowerintheUAD
group as compared to the AAD group (P = .007). This
diﬀerence was driven both by problems appreciating one’s
own diﬃculty with managing medications F(1, 32) = 5.596,
P = .024, as well as the overall ability to appreciate the
potential beneﬁts and harms of receiving assistance with
medication management, F(1, 32) = 4.34, P = .045. When
examinedindividually,neitherappreciationofpotentialben-
eﬁts nor appreciation of harms were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent as
a function of awareness.
Bivariate correlations were then used to examine the
correlates of decision making in AD. Results are reported in
Table 3:Correlatesofeverydaydecisionmaking(ACEDtotalscore)
in AD.
rP n
Age −.08 .637 37
Education .10 .555 37
MMSE .31 .066 37
Memory −.02 .940 16
Clinical rating of awareness −.41 .007 42
Metamemory score −.10 .599 31
Depression −.22 .917 37
Note. MMSE = mini-mental state examination; Memory= recognition
discriminability index; Depression = 15-item GDS.
Table 3. Clinical rating of awareness was the only character-
istic that correlated with everyday decision making in AD
(r =− .41, P = .007).
4. Discussion
The current study investigated the selective inﬂuence of
memory awareness in Alzheimer’s disease on everyday
decision-making capacity related to medication manage-
ment. As predicted, and consistent with Karlawish and
colleagues’ﬁndingsinastudyofdecisionsregardingmemory
treatment[5],awarenesswasparticularlyimportantfordeci-
sion making capacity in the current study. That is, in com-
parisontodemographicvariables,globalcognition,memory,
and mood, only memory awareness was associated with
everyday decision making. In particular, memory awareness
was clearly associated with performance on the ability to
appreciate personal diﬃculty with managing medications, as
well as the advantages and disadvantages of receiving assis-
tance with medication management. These results suggest
that reduced memory awareness in AD may pose a particu-
larly important threat to decision making, not only for med-
ical treatment and research, but for everyday issues as well.
One of the advantages of the current study was the
multiple metrics used to characterize memory awareness. In
addition to rating participants from an overall, global, and
clinical perspective, objective metamemory testing was used
to quantifymemory awarenessrigorouslyandat amore local
level. Previous work by our lab has established that scores on6 International Journal of Alzheimer’s Disease
this metamemory test track with clinical ratings of awareness
[14], and application of both methodological approaches
increases our conﬁdence that we are capturing the phe-
nomenon of disordered awareness in a reliable fashion.
Moreover, it enables consideration of the speciﬁc awareness
components which may or may not inﬂuence the outcome of
interest, in this case, everyday decision-making capacity.
Findings from the current study reinforce the idea that
in the context of early AD, awareness varies signiﬁcantly, and
this variation is not simply a reﬂection of global cognition,
demographic variables, mood, or memory. Instead, it is a
selective deﬁcit. Its clinical consequences are important and
relate to caregiver burden [27, 28], the success of behavioral
interventions [29], decisions to continue driving [12], and
medical decision making [5]. It is thus reasonable to
expect that memory awareness may also inﬂuence everyday
decisions that should be based in part on the fact that one’s
memory is impaired. Examination of medication manage-
ment decisions allowed us to answer this question, given the
idea that optimal decisions about medication management
would require appreciation of one’s memory limitations and
the need to accommodate one’s approach to this cognitively
demanding daily routine in light of these limitations.
Examination of capacity scores across awareness groups
in AD indeed revealed that decision making-capacity related
to medication management was diminished in the unaware
group, speciﬁcallyon the appreciation subscale.The appreci-
ation subscale queries the subjects to declare if they (1) have
any problems with remembering to take medications, (2)
thinkthatusinganassistivedevice(e.g.,pillbox)tohelpthem
remember to take their medications could beneﬁt them, (3)
think that having someone administer their medications to
them could beneﬁt them, and (4) think that either of these
options might actually make things worse for them.
These answers are always interpreted and scored in
the context of the information provided by the informant.
That is, if a subject denied a problem with remembering
to take medications and this was contradicted by the
informant, then a score of zero would be assigned for the
ﬁrst appreciation item. The remaining appreciation items
required subjects to consider whether or not receiving
assistance with medication management (in the form of a
device such as a pillbox or help from another individual)
could possibly beneﬁt them or perhaps make things worse
for them, and to justify their responses with a logical reason.
Points were deducted if the response reﬂected false beliefs
(e.g., I would not get any beneﬁt from a pillbox because
I do not have any trouble managing my medications) or
illogical reasoning. In contrast, the understanding subscale
does not require the individual to consider the decision from
a personal standpoint, but simply to reiterate the options
for someone who might need assistance with medication
management, to consider the beneﬁts in general, and the
disadvantagesingeneral.Itisthusapparentwhyappreciation
scores would be most aﬀected by awareness: subjects must
recognize their own diﬃculty with managing their medi-
cations. Interestingly, results indicate that unaware subjects
not only had diﬃculty recognizing their problems with
medication management (which might be expected), but
they also had diﬃculty appreciating the potential advantages
and disadvantages of receiving assistance.
The current ﬁndings nicely demonstrate that awareness
selectively aﬀects a component of capacity that requires
application of information to oneself and not those indices
which at face value have little to no metacognitive demands.
We should emphasize that we are not arguing that primary
cognitive functions are not important for capacity; of course,
they contribute to performance across the various capacity
subscales. Indeed, in the current study, both the aware and
u n a w a r eA Dg r o u p sh a dr e d u c e dc a p a c i t ys c o r e si nr e l a t i o n
to healthy elders, and studies consistently demonstrate asso-
ciations between capacity and aspects of neuropsychological
functioning in diﬀerent clinical populations (see [30]f o r
a review). What is interesting about the ﬁndings in the
current study is that in the context of very-mild-to-mild
AD, the primary factor driving capacity was self-awareness
rather than global cognition. Moreover, this was not simply
a reﬂection of the task’s hypothetical component (which
could be cognitively demanding) as actual medication
management status, that is, whether or not the participant
received assistance with medication management at home,
was comparable across awareness groups and unrelated
to ACED scores. We cannot exclude the possibility that
a speciﬁc cognitive deﬁcit such as executive dysfunction
mediated the association between capacity and awareness, as
bothvariableshavebeenassociatedwiththiscognitivedeﬁcit
[31–33], and future work should address this possibility.
However, a compelling study by Koren and colleagues
demonstrating a selective role for metacognitive rather
than executive abilities in predicting capacity to consent
to treatment in individuals with schizophrenia speaks to
this issue [34]. Speciﬁcally, on a modiﬁed version of the
Wisconsin card sorting test (WCST) in which participants
were asked to indicate whether or not they wanted each
sort “counted” toward their overall score, multiple aspects of
metacognitionwererelatedtocapacity,whereasconventional
WCST “executive” scores were unrelated. Moreover, recent
work from our lab examining nondemented elders supports
the idea that self-referential processing is independent from
more general executive abilities [24]. In sum, it appears that
aspects of metacognition are dissociable from more general
executive abilities and mayhold a particularlycritical rolefor
decision-making capacity.
This brings us to a second issue addressed in the
current study, which was whether or not speciﬁc measures of
memoryawarenessarediﬀerentiallyassociatedwithcapacity.
Interestingly, despite the association between the two mem-
ory awareness measures in the current study (clinical ratings
of awareness and metamemory scores), there was no asso-
ciation between metamemory scores and capacity (Table 3).
This discrepancy touches on the diﬀerences between the two
awareness metrics and urges us to consider what forms of
memory awareness are captured uniquely by each measure
despite their shared variance. We have argued in the past that
objective metrics of memory awareness are critically needed
for furthering our understanding of disordered awareness
in AD, particularly its nature and etiology [15], and have
shown that such metrics in fact capture clinical diﬀerences inInternational Journal of Alzheimer’s Disease 7
awareness [14]. Thus, use of objective metrics would be ideal
when attempting to shed light on the speciﬁc metacognitive
errorsthatgiverisetotheclinicalphenomenonofdisordered
awareness, for example.
However, it may be that under certain circumstances,
broad clinical impressions capture an element of self aware-
ness that is practically relevant and lost when measured at
the item level for a number of diﬀerent reasons. Speciﬁcally,
the metamemory task requires individuals to make item-
by-item predictions about performance (i.e., local level)
whereas the clinical rating of awareness queries for a much
broader assessment of oneself (i.e., global level). Each type
of self-assessment might aﬀect the other such that general
impressions about oneself might bias answers at the local
level, and impairment at the local level might lead to
impairment at the global level. However, global impressions
of one’s functioning may hold more weight for decision
making than local assessments on a speciﬁed task, because
the former represent beliefs about oneself in general rather
than within the conﬁnes of a speciﬁc task. Such global beliefs
are likely to be the basis on which we make decisions.
Moreover, an overall self-assessment that is outside the
context of a task does not provide the opportunity for an
individual to evaluate themselves online and incorporate any
feedback about task performance; in that sense, it better
approximates an individual’s general sense of themselves
and their abilities. Again, this type of self-awareness is what
appears to be critical in the context of a decision-making
paradigm in which individuals are required to consider a
particular issue and to come to a decision about the issue
in a context-free (task-free) environment. For example, the
current capacity assessment was not conducted by requiring
individuals to engage in a task (e.g., ﬁll prescriptions,
organize pills in a pillbox and prospectively remember to
take these pills) before making a decision about how best
to approach this task in daily life. Perhaps this more speciﬁc
form of capacity assessment would be more highly related to
awareness as measured through metacognitive testing.
This raises an interesting question about the manner
in which decision-making capacity is assessed and might
be assessed in the future. For example, some capacity
instruments like the one used in this study intentionally
reduce demands on episodic memory when evaluating
capacityinpatientswithAD.Thus,patientsarenotpenalized
for this particular cognitive limitation, and other elements of
decision making can be examined more directly. Similarly,
perhaps heightening subjects’ awareness in the context of
a capacity evaluation would allow examination of decision
making when an individual is provided with all information
relevant to the decision. This might be achieved in a
number of ways including (1) making explicit statements
(e.g., “You have been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease
and this disease causes your memory functioning to decline
over time”), (2) providing a context in which subjects
might recognize memory failures (e.g., cognitive testing), or
(3) conducting metacognitive testing to inform the patient
about his or her memory awareness. While there may be
ethical issues to consider for each of these approaches,
the advantage would be that decision making could be
evaluated once subjects possess accurate information about
their abilities and would thus not be biased in subjects who
have metacognitive deﬁcits.
Alternatively, it may be that assessments of capacity are
best when they approximate the “real world.” If so, then
an eﬀort to facilitate awareness in the artiﬁcial context of a
capacityevaluationwouldprovideaninaccuratedepictionof
anindividual’sdecision-makingcapacityineverydaylife.For
example, Marson and colleagues do not provide materials
that reduce memory demands in their capacity assessment
tools, and in fact, memory becomes a highly predictive
factorforperformanceinindividualswithdementia[35,36].
This may be a better representation of certain decision-
making situations encountered by individuals in daily life,
and thus an important part of the capacity evaluation. There
is not likely to be one correct approach, and the speciﬁc
circumstances of each capacity question and evaluation may
have to drive the manner in which capacity is assessed, with
the goal of balancing the patient’s autonomy and safety as
best as possible. Future work should further consider these
issuesandexplorethefeasibilityandutilityofdiﬀerentforms
of capacity assessment in individuals with dementia.
In sum, results from the current study identify memory
awareness as an important component of everyday decision
making in AD and shed light on aspects of capacity assess-
ments that may warrant additional consideration depending
on the particular issue at hand. There are several limitations
to the current study. First, it should be emphasized that
overall judgments of capacity were not made in a dichoto-
mous fashion by expert raters as has been done in other
studies. As such, the current results do not comment on
whether awareness directly aﬀects the rating of an individual
as capable or not capable to make daily decisions about
medication management. Rather, current results allow the
examination of the factors which contribute to decision
making capacity, and which might be expected to lead to
the judgment of an individual as not capable of making
a decision. Second, memory data were unavailable for the
individuals seen at the University of Pennsylvania; however,
the correlation coeﬃcient (r =− .10) reported based on
the individuals at CUMC is not suggestive of even a bor-
derline statistical association between memory and capacity.
Moreover, the manner in which capacity was measured in
the current study was speciﬁcally selected to eliminate the
demands on episodic memory, so an association was not
anticipated. Third, the cognitive battery used in the current
study was extremely limited as this was not the focus of the
current investigation. However, future work should examine
the extent to which speciﬁc aspects of cognition covary with
awareness and capacity and whether or not deﬁcits in any
area of cognition might mediate the association between
capacity and awareness. Finally, the current study did not
include an objective measure of medication management
[37, 38], a component which would have allowed us to
directlyexaminetheassociationbetweencapacity,awareness,
and the skills necessary for medication management. Despite
these limitations, the current study provides important
informationonthefactorswhichinﬂuenceeverydaydecision
making in AD, highlighting the critical role for memory8 International Journal of Alzheimer’s Disease
awareness and raising considerations for the manner in
which capacity is currently assessed.
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